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WASHINGTON CASE LAW
the legalistic requirements of the law dealing with commercial contracts
and wills. It is not inconceivable to me that the law could formulate a
slightly different type of contract, at least proof of it, to cover this social
problem; in fact, I think it is the duty of the law to recognize and give
effect to these arrangements. 9
The court's decision in the principal case is consistent with its earlier
holdings. Beginning in the late 1930's, the court reversed its prior
liberal approach to the question of oral contracts to devise.10 The deci-
sion in the principal case has polarized the conflicting viewpoints in
the court as to the validity of the present approach.
CRIMINAL LAW
Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Admissibility of Evi-
dence Incident to Arrest. Defendant was riding as a guest in a car
when Seattle police stopped the car and arrested the driver for twice
turning without signaling and for failure to produce a valid driver's
license. Defendant and the other passengers in the automobile were
also arrested and taken to jail. The car was impounded. A search of
the car the next day, accomplished without a search warrant, disclosed
two revolvers hidden under the dash. At defendant's subsequent trial
on robbery charges, the revolvers were admitted in evidence despite
defendant's motion to suppress and objection. The trial court ruled
that, although defendant's arrest was unlawful, he had no standing to
claim the privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures. On
appeal from defendant's conviction, held: A search of an impounded
car without a warrant, conducted one day after an arrest, is not incident
to the arrest, and evidence so obtained is inadmissible in a criminal
prosecution of a passenger in the car. State v. Riggins, 64 Wn.2d 897,
395 P.2d 85 (1964).
The Washington court, long before the Supreme Court's historic de-
cision in Mapp v. Ohio,' indicated approval of the federal "exclusionary
rule."2 This rule declares that evidence obtained by an unlawful search
9 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 743, 399 P.2d at 608.
3
0 See, e.g., Resor v. Schaefer, 193 Wash. 91, 74 P2d 917 (1937) ; Payn v. Hoge, 21
Wn2d 32, 149 P2d 939 (1944) ; Jennings v. D'Hooghe, 25 Wn.2d 702, 172 P2d 189(1946). As late as 1939, however, a student writer was able to state that "The Wash-
ington Court has, heretofore, been liberal in finding a contract to devise when orally
made." Comment, 14 WAsHr. L. REv. 30, 34 (1939). See Shattuck, Contracts in Wash-
ington, 1937-1957, 34 WAsr. L. REv. 24, 503-05 (1959).
1367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 See State v. Gunkel, 188 Wash. 528, 63 P.2d 376 (1936), and cases cited therein;
Comment, The Washington Law of Arrest Without Warrant-Incidental Search, 36
WAsr. L. Ray. 501, 510-11 (1961).
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may be excluded by a defendant's timely motion to suppress.' If an
arrest is unlawful, any search incident to it is unlawful.' If an arrest
is lawful, the search must still be incident to the arrest in order to be
lawful 5 Given a lawful arrest, however, the Washington court has been
reluctant to conclude that the search was not incident to the arrest.6
In State v. Olsen,' the court held that a search of the defendant's car
subsequent to the time the defendant was arrested and placed in jail on
a charge of negligent driving was incident to the arrest. Weapons and
burglary tools discovered during the search were admissible as evidence
against the defendant.
In the principal case, the court observed that defendant's arrest was
unlawful. It proceeded, however, to deem itself bound by the recent
Supreme Court decision in Preston v. United States.' Without discuss-
ing the validity of the arrest involved, the Court in Preston laid down
the following rule: "Once an accused is under arrest and in custody,
then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not
incident to the arrest."9 Because the defendant's arrest was unlawful,
it would seem that the court could have reached the same result in the
principal case without relying upon Preston 9 Apparently, therefore,
Olsen" has been overruled sub silentio, and the court has established
new, stricter requirements for all searches without warrants. This re-
sult seems highly desirable in light of the absence of the rationale for
contemporaneous searches when the defendant is safely locked up and
his vehicle secured. 2
As the trial court's decision in the principal case indicates, the Wash-
3 Professor Morris has traced the federal exclusionary rule back to Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Morris,
27te End of an Experiment in Federalism-a Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WAsx. L. REV.
407, 409-15 (1961).
-State v. Miles, 29 Wn2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948).
5 State v. Raum, 172 Wash. 680, 21 P2d 291 (1933).
6 See, e.g., State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925), 1 WAsH. L. REv.
210 (1926); State v. T-ughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 Pac. 841 (1923). In State v.
Brooks, 57 Wn2d 422, 357 P2d 735 (1960), a search prior to arrest was held incidental
thereto.
7 43 Wn2d 726, 263 P.2d 824 (1953).
8 376 U.S. 364 (1964). The defendant was arrested for vagrancy while seated with
two companions in a parked car. The car was impounded, and a subsequent search
without a warrant disclosed evidence which was used to convict the defendant and
others of conspiracy to rob a bank.9 Id. at 367.
10 See State v. Miles, 29 Wn2d 921, 190 P2d 740 (1948).
" State v. Olsen, 43 Wn2d 726, 263 P.2d 824 (1953). See text accompanying note 7
supra.
12 In Preston, the Court pointed out that the justification for contemporaneous
searches without warrants is to seize weapons which might be used to assault an officer
or effect an escape and to prevent destruction of evidence. Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
[VoL. 40: 356
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ington court had previously limited full application of the exclusionary
rule by the requirement that the defendant must have some possessive
rights in the articles seized, or in the site of their seizure, in order to
object to their introduction. In State v. Much, s the defendant had no
standing to move to suppress where "no ownership with possessive
rights" to any of the articles seized was averred. In State v. Vennir,1'
a motibn to suppress was denied where the defendant claimed no
ownership of liquor seized or of the automobile in which it was found.
Although a similar requirement of standing has been reiterated in sub-
sequent cases, 5 it was eased somewhat in State v. Michaels." The de-
fendant in Michaels, apparently only a bailee of the car searched, had
standing to move to suppress evidence seized from it.
In the principal case, the trial court seems to have relied on the cases
prior to Michaels which clearly required possessive rights. 7 Because
the Washington court did not discuss the issue of standing, these earlier
cases may have been overruled sub silentio. The United States
Supreme Court held in Jones v. United States"8 that anyone legitimately
on premises Where a search occurs may challenge its legality when its
fruits are proposed to be used against him. In Preston, however, stand-
ing was not discussed even though the defendant did not own the car
or claim the articles seized. The failure of the Washington court to
discuss standing in the principal case suggests that Michaels must now
be interpreted as strictly in accord with Jones.-
The Jones rule was based upon interpretation of a federal procedural
rule,19 and it may not be applicable in Washington without some further
explanation."0 Assuming that the Jones rule does apply in Washington,
13 156 Wash. 403, 287 Pac. 57 (1930).
14159 Wash. 58, 291 Pac. 1098 (1930).15 See State v. Wooten, 44 Wn.2d 177, 266 P.2d 342 (1954) ; State v. Funk, 170
Wash. 560, 17 P2d 11 (1932).16 60 Wn.2d 638, 374 P2d 989 (1962), 38 WAsH. L. REv. 320 (1963).
17 See Brief for Respondent, pp. 4, 9-11, State v. Michaels, 60 Wn2d 638, 374 P2d
989 (1962).i8 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
19 Fr. R. Cmm. P. 41(e).2 0 See Weeks, Standing to Object in the Field of Search and Seizure, 6 ARiz. L. REV.
65, 72 (1964), where Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), is interpreted as
relying on FED. R. Cm m P. 41(e) to establish, rather than to limit, the requirement of
standing. Indeed the author indicates, id. at 77, that the state courts are now re-
stricted to the alternatives of following the relatively lenient requirements of Jones or
rejecting the standing requirement entirely- This would indicate- that the Jones decision
is incorporated in the fourth amendment as a maximuns standing requirement, a view
finding some support in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963), where it was
stated: '"he States are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules govern-
ing arrests, searches and seizures ... provided that those iules do not violate the con-
stitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant com-
mand that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to complain.
See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)." (Emphasis added.)
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a person unlawfully on premises where a search occurs can not complain
if evidence obtained during the search is used against him. Anyone
else is, and should be, protected from unlawful official invasion of
privacy.
Jurisdiction-Habeas Corpus-State Jurisdiction Over Constitu-
tional Questions Pending in Federal Court. In July, 1960, petitioner
Don Anthony White was convicted of murder in the first degree and
sentenced to death. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction,1 and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court.2 In February 1964, the Washington court denied petitioner's
application for writ of habeas corpus.' Petitioner then applied for writ
of habeas corpus in the federal district court. This petition raised a
new issue based on facts asserted to have come to the attention of
petitioner's counsel subsequent to the denial of the application by the
Washington court." Respondent penitentiary superintendant main-
tained that petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies in regard
to this issue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254.1 The district court
ordered that the cause be held in abeyance subject to petitioner's sub-
mission of a new application to the state supreme court. Upon petition-
er's application to the Washington Supreme Court for writ of habeas
I State v. White, 60 Wn.2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962).
2 White v. Washington, 375 U.S. 883 (1963).
8 In re White v. Rhay, 64 Wn.2d 15, 390 P2d 535 (1964).
4The petition, as quoted in Judge Finley's opinion, read in part as follows:
"4. Petitioner was held in police custody, and questioned over a period of eleven
days before he was provided with counsel; and because of his weakened mental and
physical condition during such custody, without counsel, and without having had a
hearing before a magistrate, the entire circumstance of the police procedure was intimi-
dating and coercive.
VII. Petitioner was denied due process and the guarantees of the Sixth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States because he was not provided counsel when
needed, and because his physical and mental condition was so debilitated and diseased
that he could not intelligently or competently waive the right to counsel, about which
he was not informed and which the record discloses, he knew nothing about. The
admission and confessions of petitioner, made without advice of counsel, and introduced
at trial, violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights.
1. The record discloses that petitioner was at no time advised that he did not have to
give a statement or to submit to interrogation, and there are no facts from which any
inference can be drawn that petitioner knew or understood that he had a right to remain
silent." 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 714, 399 P2d at 537.
528 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958), provides in part: "An application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State. .. ." In Duffy v. Wells, 201 F.2d 503, 504 (9th Cir. 1952), it
was stated: "Section 2254 does not deny jurisdiction where the state remedies have not
been exhausted. That section provides only that the application shall not be 'granted'
unless it appears that the state remedies have been exhausted. .. ." (Emphasis added.)
[VoL. 40:356
